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Theorising the ‘deliberative father’: compromise, 
progress and striving to do fatherhood well 
Jonathan Ives, University of Birmingham, UK  
j.c.ives@bham.ac.uk
This article presents qualitative data collected during a project funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council exploring 11 men’s experience of first-time fatherhood. It draws specifically on 
data from interviews conducted after the birth of their child, to present three different ways that 
men attempt to construct ‘fairness’ in their fathering practice. It uses this data to begin to theorise 
the ‘deliberative father’, which is presented as a morally progressive form of fatherhood that 
focuses on process rather than practice. Three counter-arguments are considered, with particular 
attention paid to Reece’s (2013) argument against thin conceptions of ‘reflective’ parenting. The 
article concludes that deliberative fatherhood is not morally progressive because the process of 
deliberation ensures morally optimal practice. Rather, it is morally progressive because the process 
of deliberation makes morally optimal practice possible. 
key words fathers • fatherhood • moral progress • compromise • parenting
Background
Contemporary fatherhood is increasingly characterised as a more practically involved 
and emotionally engaged role than it has been in the past (Dermott and Miller, 
forthcoming). This shift is not simply observed, but has also been evaluated and 
endorsed, giving rise to an ethical normativity that, to use Furstenberg’s (1988) 
term, distinguishes between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ fathers. This linkage of changes in 
fatherhood practice to some kind of moral progress contributes to a moral discourse 
of contemporary parenthood, which, when applied to fatherhood in the United 
Kingdom (UK), has tended to centre on a moral imperative to create and support 
the kinds of involved and engaged fathering practices that benefit children (Ives, 
2014). The moral discourse of contemporary fatherhood is associated not only with 
direct fathering practice for the benefit of the child but, as Collier (2010) has noted, 
also with wider concerns about justice, gender equality and social cohesion. Collier’s 
point is that although parenting practices are putatively focused on the child, there 
are underlying narratives around the moral legitimacy of those practices that are 
connected to more general normative debates about the gendered division of labour 
in the home and the workplace, and the gendered (in)equity that this represents. Given 
this, contemporary conceptions of the ‘good father’ seem to encompass more than a 
commitment to the child, but also a commitment to gender equality and the sharing 
of labour and resources in a fair, equitable and, above all, justifiable way.
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Contemporary fatherhood, then, is associated with ‘progressive’ forms of caring 
masculinity, which challenge the gendered, and traditionally unequal, dichotomy 
between work and home, public and private, breadwinning and childcare. It is 
ostensibly premised on a rejection of the traditional breadwinner model, and an 
endorsement of a fatherhood focused on achieving ‘intimate engagement in multiple 
aspects of their child’s life’ (Dermott, and Miller, forthcoming). While the term 
‘new’ fatherhood was once used ubiquitously to describe this phenomenon, more 
recent scholarship has looked for terms that better capture the complex nature 
of contemporary fatherhood. For example, Dermott (2008) describes ‘intimacy’, 
characterised by prioritising the formation and maintenance of an emotional bond 
and child-focused activities. In intimate fatherhood, breadwinning is recognised as a 
central fatherhood role, but its relative importance is downplayed. Williams (2008), 
alternatively, theorises the ‘reflexive father’, whose fathering practice is a response to 
personal circumstance and life history. 
This article draws on data collected during a two-year study of men’s transition to 
fatherhood, and theorises the ‘deliberative father’. Data are presented that demonstrate 
men’s engagement with, and construction of, fatherhood as a moral activity intimately 
connected to various constructions of ‘fairness’. I will argue that this is demonstrative 
of an approach to fatherhood that is more concerned about process (ie, how fatherhood 
roles are constructed and negotiated) than practice (ie, what fatherhood roles are 
actually performed), and that this focus on process ought to be definitive of morally 
progressive fatherhood. 
Methods
Men were followed over approximately eight to nine months (from the first 12-
week scan to eight weeks after the birth of their baby). Regular face-to-face and 
telephone interviews were held with participants over this time, which explored their 
experiences of/feelings about becoming a father, and mapped their journey from 
early pregnancy to early fatherhood.
Participants were recruited through community midwives and hospital maternity 
units in the West Midlands, UK. Potential participants were provided with an 
information pack by their midwife (directly or via their partner) at the initial booking 
appointment, and asked to contact the author if they were interested in taking part. 
Of the 16 eligible respondents, 11 men were purposively sampled to achieve as wide 
a range of ethnicity, age, education and employment as possible (see Table 1). 
A combination of in-depth face-to-face and telephone interviews was employed, 
with one interview held approximately once a month (see Figure 1). Telephone 
interviews were relatively structured, and aimed to elicit information about ongoing 
routine, or unusual, events that had occurred since the last interview. Face-to-face 
interviews were semi-structured, with a topic guide comprising a series of standard 
questions that focused on: 
• expectations;
• intentions;
• perceptions of self and others;
• birth;
• normative ideals of fatherhood;
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• experience of maternity services;
• difficulties/concerns;
• support/information needs. 
The topic guide was also informed by the content of previous telephone interviews, 
enabling face-to-face interviews to be oriented around issues raised by participants 
themselves.
Ongoing and concurrent data collection and coding facilitated an iterative analysis, 
generating theories that were grounded in the data (Charmaz, 2006). Emergent 
themes from initial interviews were used to generate hypotheses that were explored 
in subsequent interviews. This process enabled a form of iterative member validation, 
in which participants were invited to reflect on the ongoing analysis of the dataset 
as a whole and their own individual story. Interview data were initially open-coded 
(Saldana, 2010) for meaningful content, with codes organised into thematic categories. 
These categories were interrogated to expose relationships between them, and 
these relationships were interpreted to generate an overarching set of core themes 
and develop explanatory theories. Constant comparison and deviant case analysis 
(Silverman, 2005) were employed throughout.1 
Table 1: Participant demographics (self-reported)
Pseudonym Ethnicity Age Relationship to 
child’s mother
Highest 
educational 
qualification
Employment 
status
Current/most 
recent field of 
employment
Ben White British 22 Cohabiting A-level Employed Customer 
service
Brian White British 44 Married NVQ Self-
employed
Mortgage advice
Charles White British 40 Married Degree Self-
employed
E-commerce
Daniel White British 31 Married Degree Employed Civil service
James White British 29 Married Degree Employed Project 
management
Janesh British Asian 27 Married Vocational 
degree
Employed Dentistry
Michael White British 22 Cohabiting NVQ Employed Marketing
Peter White British 58 Married O-level Retired Haulage 
Phil White British 35 Married HND Employed Information 
technology
Sandeep Indian 31 Married Vocational 
degree
Employed Optometry
Simon Black 
Caribbean
35 Married Degree Employed Public relations 
account 
management
 
Note: HND = Higher National Diploma; NVQ = National Vocational Qualification.
Semi-structured 
interview
Semi-structured 
interview
Semi-structured 
interview
Semi-structured 
interview
Structured phone 
interview
Structured phone 
interview
Structured phone 
interview
Week 12 Week 25 Week 36 Week 8
16-17 20-21 28-29 32-33 40-42 2-4
Birth
Figure 1: Placement of interviews
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Data presented in this article were all drawn from two sets of interviews with each 
participant, one face-to-face and one telephone interview, in the first eight weeks 
after birth.
Findings
Overall, a major concern for participants in the first two months of fatherhood was 
finding an appropriate level of work for themselves in relation to both their own and 
their partner’s needs. All participants bar two (James and Peter) planned to be primary 
breadwinners, while their partners would be primary carers. All were very aware of 
the normative discourse of contemporary fatherhood, and were keen to be involved 
fathers, both physically present and emotionally engaged. They were also concerned 
that they made a ‘fair’ contribution, and did not leave their partners overburdened. 
The data presented below outline three different narratives of ‘fairness’ that were 
identified in the accounts provided by participants, and these specific data have been 
selected for presentation in order to challenge and interrogate ideas about morally 
progressive fatherhood. 
Before the data are presented, it is important to note that all the fathers in this 
study were first-time fathers, up to eight weeks after the birth of their first child. As 
such, the data below represent their attempts to find ‘fairness’ in the very early stages 
of fatherhood.
Fairness as reciprocity 
Fairness as reciprocity identified the mother as the primary carer and the father 
the primary breadwinner. However, these roles were not fixed or exclusive, and 
practising fairness as reciprocity involved fathers recognising the demands placed on 
their partners and trying to lessen the burden where possible. Michael, for example, 
described wanting to do as much as he could, but felt that, given his breadwinning 
role, he could not stay up for night feeds. He tried to make things ‘fair’ by reciprocating 
his wife’s work at weekends and taking over the night feeds: 
‘I still wanted to do as much as I possibly could … but clearly if I’m doing all 
the night feeds in the week and then going to work, I’d probably be asleep 
for the whole weekend. So it just doesn’t work. Whereas on the weekend 
at least I’m there, more relaxed, not having to get up at six o’clock in the 
morning, erm and can obviously give my partner a break from doing the 
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night feeds and what have you. But I try in the week, when I’m home, to 
do a couple of feeds, to give my partner a break because she’s had her all 
day…. I think you soon realise actually you can’t physically do all of that 
and you need to share out tasks and that’s probably what actually takes the 
time to get used to….’ (Michael)
Charles had a similar, but less formalised, arrangement. He reflected on the fact that 
he was getting more sleep than his wife – a result of his wife breastfeeding and him 
not waking up when she did – and reported feeling like he was “letting her down”. 
He described an attempt to reciprocate her efforts at night by giving her time to sleep 
during the day. This was something he was able to do because he was self-employed 
and worked from home:
‘I get a lot more sleep than she does. Not that I’m complaining, no but it 
kind of makes me feel like I’m letting her down a bit, which is kind of why, 
I think, during the day, if I can let her have, you know, a couple of hours 
snooze or something, then she should.’ (Charles)
Janesh was very explicit about trying to make things as fair as possible for both himself 
and his wife. He described their weekday routine, with him working during the day 
and returning home to take over childcare while his wife had a rest. His wife then 
took over for the ‘night shift’ so that Janesh could get enough sleep to work the next 
day. He reflected, however, that this arrangement was not perfect, and felt that he 
did not get any time to relax. He was either working, looking after his daughter or 
sleeping, and reflected that he did not get any downtime. He also believed that his 
daughter was at her most fractious in the early evening, and he consequently spent 
that time trying to calm her rather than enjoying her:
‘[W]hen I’m working during the week, basically, we decided that I’ll sleep 
at night time, or try and sleep and I won’t get up for the night shift … but 
after work I’ll come home and I’ll look after her until about 11.30 when 
she goes into bed and then [wife] will have a little bit of a rest, a bit of her 
own time, and then she’ll do the night shift. ... so we’re trying to make it as 
fair as possible for each other, but it still feels like a full-time job for both of 
us, because I think when you’re at work all day, when you come in … you 
don’t really have a moment to relax, and then coming home and then literally 
chucking whatever down your throat and just eat because [you’re] looking 
after her and I think sometimes she can be the most difficult between … 
before going to bed properly, so you’ve got almost, you know, just trying to 
calm her down.’ (Janesh)
Janesh highlights a potential difficulty of a reciprocal approach to fairness. There is 
nothing straightforward about reciprocity in this context, and the extent to which some 
work is a reciprocation of other work is highly subjective and might vary with time, 
place, competence and expectation. The period in which Janesh tried to reciprocate, 
he felt, was a particularly difficult time in which his daughter was fractious, and it 
was not obviously ‘fair’ that his wife rested at the time when their daughter was at 
her most difficult – especially given that as a non-primary carer Janesh may have 
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been less experienced and less able to handle the difficulty. On the other hand, it 
was not obviously ‘unfair’ either. That time in the early evening was the only period 
when Janesh could do that work and when his wife could rest. Arguably, those four 
to five difficult hours might just about have reciprocated the 19 to 20 hours of solid 
childcare his wife undertook on a daily basis. It is difficult to identify any objective 
measure of fairness here, and the extent to which the relative ‘difficulty’ of childcare 
work undertaken at different times of the day is measurable is highly uncertain. The 
difficulty in finding an objective measure, and balance, speaks to the necessity of the 
kind of discussion and communication that Michael described. He characterised it 
as a negotiation; trial and error, with both he and his wife taking a reflexive attitude 
towards their parenting arrangements and working out what worked for them and 
what did not:
‘I think after the first week that I’d been back [at work] we sort of thought 
actually, what can we do better next week? And then at the end of that week, 
we said right okay, where did we maybe go wrong and what could we do 
better the following week, so that it just makes it easier for all of us. Because 
at the end of the day you want to be there and support both of them anyway, 
as much as you can. And that’s the difficulty, you want to do as much as you 
can but have to actually realise that if you’re going to work and then do 
everything that you wanted to do, you soon run out of … steam.’ (Michael)
Fairness as equality 
Another approach to fairness, used by a few participants, is the ‘equality’ model, 
involving either splitting time equally or trying to share all tasks. James described 
one approach when he talked about an attempt to get some sleep by going to the 
spare room. James’s wife made the suggestion, but he said he could not do it. Having 
permission was not enough to make it seem fair to him, and he still ended up trying 
to help his wife to have the same amount of sleep that he had. He described it as 
‘sharing the pain’: 
“It’s like go out to the spare room and, you know, get some rest, you know, 
it’s no- I’m gonna be up, you know, I’ve had a few hours’ sleep already, like 
you haven’t, you’ve been awake so, you know, let’s swap, let’s share the pain” 
(James).
Brian described a different approach, which involved doing everything together. He 
talked about how he and his wife had considered taking turns, but decided it would 
not be feasible because his wife would not be able to sleep regardless of whose turn 
it was. That arrangement would not, in Brian’s eyes, be fair, because even though 
he would have one night on and one night off, his wife would have no nights off. 
Consequently, he described trying to do everything together:
‘[W]e both get up, because … you know, one of the things that you’ve 
probably gathered with us is that we’ve done everything together throughout 
this. This has been our journey and erm we continue to do that. I think 
somebody said “You should take it in turns,” you know, and I must admit 
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that does appeal to a degree, you know, that [wife] will get up one night, I’ll 
get up the next night, but then if I get up and [wife]’s in bed, she won’t sleep 
because I know she won’t because she’ll be listening and going “Is everything 
all right?”. And whereas me, I’d probably just go back to sleep, but I know 
that [wife] won’t sleep if we agreed to that. She’d be up because she’s, erm ... 
I don’t know whether it’s maternal instinct, or what, but I think she would 
still be up and “Is anything wrong?”.... So we’re doing it together.’ (Brian)
An equality model of fairness has certain attractions, and the notion of ‘sharing the 
pain’ may be appealing because it focuses on parenting as a shared experience, where 
the trials and tribulations of an undoubtedly tough period are experienced together. 
However, overall, it may not be the most efficacious use of time and resources, 
and sharing the childcare role equally only contributes to ‘overall’ fairness if it is 
accompanied by an equal sharing of other domestic and economic labour.
Fairness as functional specialisation
An alternative model of fairness could be described as ‘functional specialisation’. This 
term covers a range of approaches that are all based on specialising in specific tasks 
and roles. Ben, for example, talked about how he and his partner had discovered that 
they were good at different things, and so tried to split labour along those lines. Ben 
did the majority of the winding, while his partner was better at changing nappies. 
This may be considered fair because it meant that neither of them was struggling to 
do tasks that they were uncomfortable with or found difficult. Ben and his partner 
had tried to work out a system of taking turns at night, but found that it did not 
work because too often the ‘on-duty parent’ did not wake up. The ad-hoc system 
they developed, working on the basis of whoever gets up first, deals with the baby, 
seemed to work for Ben, who noted that while he did occasionally get an ‘elbow in 
the back’ it ‘tends to level out’:
Ben: ‘It’s kind of just trial and error really. It’s like we’ve found out I’m 
a little bit better at getting the wind up, and [partner]’s a lot better 
at like the whole changing and stuff like that, so normally I’ll feed 
her and wind her, and [partner] will get her changed, and I think it 
depends who’s more awake at that one point as well, when it comes 
to the night. Because obviously she’s with her all day, so I do like to 
try and give her a bit of a break when I get back from work. But 
when it’s a three o’clock in the morning, it’s hard to drag yourself 
out of bed sometimes. So it’s just whoever gets to her first normally. 
We try – we did try and work out like a little system but it didn’t 
work so….’
Author: ‘What was that system?’
Ben: ‘We said we’d take it in turns, if she got up, I’ll go first then [partner], 
then ... but it just doesn’t work like that because sometimes you do 
sleep through it, it’s not often, but now and again. So you get a bit 
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of an angry elbow in the back. Get up. But it kind of levels itself out 
if I’m honest.’
An alternative approach to functional specialisation was taken by Phil, who had 
difficulty with the reciprocal model he was trying to establish. He was becoming 
too tired to function at work, and the tipping point came when he was driving on a 
regular commute and found himself shaking. People at work started to comment on 
how terrible he looked, and he decided he could not go on trying to do so much. 
He recalled a conversation he had with someone at work who gave him some advice:
‘I think it was a comment that the guys said at work, he said at the end of 
the day, you’re there to support your wife, and your wife is there to support 
your child, and erm – and you know that is the case because I have to go 
to work and I have to earn the money in order to – for, you know, for us 
to continue. So I think that was a good, simple way of looking at it.’ (Phil)
This way of looking at it enabled Phil to focus on what he saw as his primary role – 
breadwinning – and to take steps to ensure that he could function adequately in it. 
This led, he said, to some unfamiliar tension in his relationship, until he and his wife 
had an open discussion about it:
‘It wasn’t that we’d fall out with each other but it was sort of strained. I 
mean, I’ve explained how our relationship is really solid and we don’t sort of 
ever argue but – we never sort of argued but it wasn’t the norm, and it was 
slightly more strained between us ... especially when we first got into the 
new routine, and basically I was saying, “Look, I’ll do his last feed, and then 
I’ll sleep and then I’ll go to work, I’m up and out.” I get up at six and so I 
was sort of getting back to that and I think she was waking up thinking, “oh”, 
especially when we had difficulties with him, he basically wasn’t sleeping 
through the night, and she would sort of look at me and say, you know, “Why 
do you get to sleep?”, you know, but having that chat, I think that makes it 
better, and just saying, “Look, we’re trying to please each other” but I was 
struggling at work, and I explained that to her, and she was sort of, erm, she 
was used to this like, “I’m going to sleep all night”.… Trying to get in the 
right mindsets to think, “If I don’t sleep all night, it doesn’t matter because 
I’m not going to work tomorrow”, you know, erm I can’t sleep in the day 
and I think it was getting that frame of mind and I think that conversation 
helped, so we’re back to normal now.’ (Phil)
When Phil was asked how easy it was to initiate that conversation, he described how 
he needed to reconcile it with himself first before raising it with his wife, and how 
he was worried about being selfish:
‘I’ll have a mental game in my own head, sort of thinking, yeah, you are 
going to work, but you know, you can’t not help, because [wife] needs her 
sleep as well. She needs to relax. So I think it was getting it into sort of an 
order where erm it seemed fair for me to sort of talk to her about it. So, no, 
it wasn’t overly hard, and it was – I think we both came to … the same point 
together because [wife] said I think I’ve been trying to pull in too many 
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ways, and I was sort of saying, “Well yeah, I need to sleep and I think if we 
do it this way I’ll do the last feed, and then”, you know, so it wasn’t that hard 
but it was – it was just a bit slightly awkward to try and – wondering how 
to put it across in a way that you don’t seem like I’m trying to get out of it, 
kind of thing. I think that was the hard bit, was my personal feeling of “am 
I sounding like I’m going to be a bit of, you know, a bit of a, well, being a 
bit selfish”, yeah, that’s the word.’ (Phil)
An alternative approach was taken by Peter, who was retired and became a stay-at-
home father while his wife went out to work. Peter explained that because his wife 
had to work he did not want her sleep pattern disturbed, and so he did all the night 
shifts. He described how he undertook all the domestic labour so that his wife could 
spend time with their son when she was at home:
‘Things like the night feed, I agreed that I would do it because I didn’t want 
[wife] to change her sleep pattern or anything and get disturbed and have a 
poor night’s sleep. Obviously when I get up to feed him it does disturb her 
but to a lesser degree. As I say, I’m up for about an hour by the time I’ve 
fed him, changed him and got back to bed and perhaps managing to get to 
sleep but not always.… Um, so the night shifts, I volunteered to do and um, 
like yesterday, when [wife] came back from work we prepared tea together 
and she bathed him because she wanted involvement, but even though she 
was bathing him, I still went up and changed the bin and that and passed her 
this, that and the other. So I was still involved but not actually the bathing 
of him, ’cause she wants to be involved. But when she’s at home, she wants 
to have as much involvement with him as she can. So domestic things, as far 
as I’m concerned, err, just from [wife], don’t matter, because I’ll take care 
of those, let her enjoy him when she’s at home ’cause the rest of the time, 
she’s either sleeping or she’s at work.’ (Peter)
This arrangement seemed initially, to me, very progressive, as a complete rejection 
of traditionally gendered parenting roles. On a closer look, however, I found it 
difficult to see precisely why it was progressive, given that it seemed to replicate, 
almost exactly, a strongly gendered, and arguably regressive, form of parenting, based 
on a separate primary carer and breadwinner, of the kind advocated by the 1950s’ 
parenting ‘expert’ Donald Winnicott (1957). It is the father who stays at home, does 
all the housework and primary childcare, and facilitates his wife’s relationship with 
her child. Peter’s wife, in this case, appeared be taking on the distant breadwinner role, 
with the relationship with her child mediated and facilitated by Peter, who ensured 
that she did not have to worry about domestic labour and had the opportunity to 
bond with her child. If Janesh, above, had described his wife doing all the domestic 
labour and childcare and facilitating access to his child, this would seem regressive 
in the extreme. Peter’s arrangement, and our response to it, should therefore give 
significant pause for thought.2 
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Discussion
The data presented above challenged me, and I hope will also challenge the reader, 
to think critically about what it is we find progressive and morally laudable about 
the recent shifts in fathering culture, and what ‘progress’ in contemporary fatherhood 
really is. Current discourse tends to focus on role fulfilment (ie, practice): 
• Does the father spend enough quality time with his children? 
• Does he prioritise work or family? 
• Does he demonstrate affection? 
• Does he share equally in household labour? 
The problem with this framing, however, is that it produces a moral imperative to 
achieve an idealised fatherhood that can give the impression of an individual father 
‘failing’ if he cannot fulfil all these roles (Dermott, 2008; Genesoni and Tallandini, 
2009; Draper and Ives, 2013). Different ways of conceptualising fatherhood try to 
reframe it to mitigate the risk of men failing as fathers because they are unable to 
live up to an expert-mandated ideal. Dermott’s (2008: 143) intimate fatherhood, for 
example, tries to move ‘beyond narrow formulations of fathers, either as failing to 
contribute to, or as sidelined from, family life’. ‘Intimacy’ might legitimise, through 
economic necessity, physical absence, which is compensated for by investing heavily in 
an emotional relationship with the child. Similarly, Williams’s ‘reflexive father’ will pay 
less attention to normative ideals of fatherhood, and develops his individual practices 
around his personal biography and circumstances. In Williams’s (2008: 501) own words:
[H]ow they behave as fathers is dependent on their own family circumstances, 
by what they are compelled to do by situational circumstances. Though many 
of the men talk about wanting to be different to their own fathers in terms 
of many key aspects of their relationships with partners and children, they 
acknowledge that they also have to be different if they are to maintain a 
relationship with their partners. Changes in domestic arrangements are not 
without conflict, but the men recognize the problems of a failure to adapt 
as well as the benefits of adapting. 
These accounts are, arguably, morally preferable because, rather than imposing a set of 
prescriptive norms that may not always be possible to adhere to, they appreciate the 
complexity of adhering to those norms in the context of modern family life, allowing 
individuals to respond flexibly to the various competing demands placed on them in 
differently legitimate ways (see also Ives, 2014). Rather than specifying that a father 
must do X, Y and Z regardless of context, they approach the moral complexity of 
fatherhood from the point of view of a pragmatic and naturalistic ethics, which rejects 
the idea that we can draw on externally derived foundational principles to assess the 
rights and wrongs of a father’s practice. Rather, we have to look at the details of the 
practice, and examine the context in which the practice takes place, and in doing so 
we can learn about what good fatherhood is for that father, given the circumstances 
in which he is operating.3
The data presented above show various ways in which men can adopt a critical 
stance towards the ideal of the ‘new’ father, and try to negotiate a path through the 
Theorising the ‘deliberative father’
11
moral maze of fatherhood, acutely aware of the ethically normative dimensions of 
their practice. They reveal different strategies for thinking carefully about what their 
role is, what it ought to be, and how to achieve a working balance that is practically 
achievable and ethically acceptable in the context of their relationships and broader 
discourses of ‘good’ fatherhood and masculinities. In doing so, we can see these 
participants developing compromises that reflect their personal circumstances, but are 
reconcilable (in theory) with broader moral commitments to fairness and equality. 
The moral concept at work in the findings above – ‘fairness’ – is highly subjective 
and context dependent, and supervenes on facts such as expectations, relationship 
norms, appetite for certain kinds of work, capacity and competence. Therefore, what 
is fair in the context of one couple will not be fair in another, and what is considered 
‘fair’ overall may not be what is ‘equal’.4 Imperfect and messy though these solutions 
undoubtedly are, and however open to criticism they may be, they represent a striving 
to ‘do fatherhood well’, characterised by an awareness of relevant moral discourses 
and a conscious deliberation of the choices available to them and the moral demands 
placed on them. This, then, presents us with the concept of the ‘deliberative father’.
The broad idea that some kind of reflective practice defines good parenthood 
is not without its critics. Claims that reflexivity is morally praiseworthy in and of 
itself may be challenged by general criticisms that it constitutes self-indulgent naval 
gazing (which, arguably, can be dealt with by performing it conscientiously; see Ives 
and Dunn, 2010), or more specific and salient criticism, such as that laid down by 
Reece (2013). Reece argues that constructing the ‘good’ parent as the ‘self-reflective’ 
parent is deeply problematic. She appeals to the problem of infinite regress, arguing 
that because the process of reflection, introspection and self-discovery is ongoing and 
potentially never ending, those processes can never provide adequate justification for 
parenting decisions. Even after substantial reflection:
parenting decision[s] will still be suspect, because [parents] can never claim to 
have reflected sufficiently to have achieved clear self-knowledge. This means 
that, just like substantive positive parenting, reflection is a life-long process, 
never fully achieved. The consequence is that, after reflection just as much 
as before reflection, [the parent] faces an impossible struggle to know what 
he really wants to decide. (Reece, 2013: 52)
Reece’s concern that the difficulty in determining how much reflection is enough 
leads to the worry that mere reflection is not enough to overcome culturally embedded 
‘expert discourse in the absence of a measuring rod for reflection’ (Reece, 2013: 52). 
Reece is concerned that reflection merely defers the difficult decision to the point 
of when to stop reflecting and act. Even after reflection, this decision, argues Reece 
(2013: 52), ‘leads us straight back into the arms of a substantively correct approach to 
parenting, which will inevitably be laid down by experts and officials’.
This critique, however, is limited, and need not apply to the ‘deliberative father’. 
First, it deals with a narrow conception of reflection and reflexivity, limited to 
introspection and self-analysis. The ‘deliberative’ process tentatively outlined above 
is much more than this. Deliberation, in the sense being talked about here, involves a 
wide-ranging analysis of what one ought to do, involving thoughtful consideration 
of what one is prima facie obliged to do, what one is prima facie entitled to, one’s 
own needs and the needs of others. It seeks to justify one’s action and choices, and 
Jonathan Ives 
12
to do so in a way that can be subject to external criticism; and that requires external 
discussion and negotiation. This is quite different from the introspection, reflection 
and self-discovery characterised by Reece and those she is criticising (eg, Stadlen, 
2004; Ramaekers and Suissa, 2012).
Second, the critique relies on this narrow conception to argue that it can never truly 
result in divergence from the substantively correct approach laid out by experts. The 
assumption that the problem of infinite regress means there is no end point, meaning 
that exiting from reflection will always be defined by experts, assumes, wrongly, that 
people are not capable of independent thought resulting in action that challenges 
expert opinion. It speaks to the assumed (but certainly not inconsequential) power 
differential between the ‘lay person’ and the ‘expert’, and the antecedent power of 
normative discourses that direct us to act in certain ways in order to ‘comply’ and avoid 
deviance. The idea that people will always end up doing what the experts say assumes, 
however, that individuals are always powerless to challenge these norms, will either 
perform deliberation badly (in which case they are not sufficiently deliberative) or 
are simply incapable of it. The middle claim can be accepted without a problem. Not 
everyone will be able or willing to deliberate conscientiously, and this does not speak 
against deliberative fatherhood in itself. The first and last claims, however, are simply 
untrue, as evidenced by the data from this study (presented above and in Ives, 2014), 
which suggest that some men are capable of deliberation that results in them taking 
what experts might describe as an intransigent line towards fathering and parenting 
relationships. Furthermore, the fact that deliberation may end up in agreement with 
the ‘experts’ is not a problem. It is quite possible that, after undergoing a process of 
deliberation, one might well decide on a course of action that is supported by ‘experts’. 
The morally relevant difference is that the expert-sanctioned action is not performed 
because it is sanctioned by ‘experts’, but because the parent has decided that, on this 
occasion, they agree with the expert line. 
A third criticism, which is perhaps the most salient, is that if we define good 
fatherhood in terms of process, then simply undergoing the right process would 
make any decision the correct one. This slide into process-driven relativism is not 
necessary. The outcome of any process of deliberation can always be criticised, and 
the deliberative father should always take on board and deliberate on that criticism. 
The way to think about moral progress, here, which I outline in depth elsewhere 
(Ives, 2013), is as a constant striving for improvement, on the understanding that 
any solution we find to a moral problem will be imperfect, fallible and most likely 
temporary, because circumstances always change. There is never any clear point at 
which to stop deliberating, and no fixed reference point, but practical necessity 
means we have to stop thinking and act at some point, and that is what necessitates 
compromise. Conscientiously engaging in the process of deliberation with the goal 
of being a morally good father (and partner, and man), accepting that there will be 
reasonable disagreement about what achieving this goal involves, and being aware 
that achieving that goal requires negotiation and compromise, admits the possibility 
that he could get it ‘right’. It does not guarantee that he has. When we do not know 
precisely where the goal is, or what shape it is, the best we can do is ensure that we 
are running towards where we think it is, on the understanding that we might have 
to change direction. It is only by deliberating that we can ever become aware of the 
need to change direction. We do not have a clear and universal idea of what morally 
Theorising the ‘deliberative father’
13
optimal fatherhood looks like, and until we do, a good father can only be someone 
who is actively trying to find out.
The fact that this deliberation, and resultant compromise, may lead to practices that 
could be criticised for being ethically and practically sub-optimal, by anyone, misses 
the point entirely. The realities of fatherhood and family life mean that compromises 
have to be made, because parenthood is replete with dilemmatic tensions that have 
to be resolved (see also Ives, 2014). There are reasons why we might be critical of 
some of the practices described by participants in this article, not least because an 
alternative explanation for what they are doing is that they are engaging in post-hoc 
justification for the roles they have chosen, attempting to ‘shoehorn’ their practices 
into notions of fairness and equality in order to justify them. The empirical question 
of whether or not participants in this study were engaging in that kind of post-hoc 
justification, or whether they were being merely aspirational in their search for 
fairness, is moot. The important, and more interesting, point is that the alternative 
interpretation, the deliberative father, presents us with a potentially new way of 
theorising morally progressive fatherhood, and gives us a way of explaining why it 
is morally progressive that goes beyond adherence to idealised norms laid down by 
experts. It is not progressive because it conforms to ideals of best practice and role 
fulfilment. Rather, it is progressive because it represents a morally enlightened approach 
to the process of working out who should do what and why. It recognises fatherhood 
as a distinctly moral practice, and takes seriously the requirement to consider the wider 
relational aspects of that practice, and not just those directly related to childcare. It is 
not morally progressive because the process of deliberation ensures morally optimal 
practice. It is, rather, morally progressive because the process of deliberation makes 
morally optimal practice possible.
Notes
1  A more detailed exposition of the analytic process can be found in Ives (2014).
2 Peter’s case, however, is not strictly analogous to the stay-at-home mother norm. Having 
retired from his job, Peter is not giving up a possible career to be a stay-at-home father. 
This is in contrast to many stay-at-home mothers, who may have career prospects damaged 
by taking time out.
3 For more details about this kind of account of ethics, see Racine (2008), Frith (2010) 
and Ives (2013). 
4 Given that what is ‘equal’ is not always what is fair. Fairness incorporates notions of 
justice, and justice may require that equal things are treated equally and unequal things 
treated unequally. What is fair, therefore, may not be what is equal.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number 
RES-000-22-3964). I would like to thank all the members of the Oxford Fatherhood 
Network for their critical and constructive feedback on early drafts, in particular Esther 
Dermott and Tina Miller, and the two anonymous reviewers. Finally, thank you to the 
men who volunteered their time to take part, and thereby made this article possible.
References
Charmaz, K, 2006, Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative 
analysis. Thousand oaks, CA: Sage Publications
Jonathan Ives 
14
Collier, R, 2010, Men, law and gender: Essays on the ‘man’ of law, Abingdon: Routledge
Dermott, E, 2008, Intimate fatherhood: A sociological analysis, Abingdon: Routledge
Dermott, H, Miller, T, forthcoming, More than the sum of its parts: contemporary 
fatherhood, is anything new? Families, Relationships and Societies
Draper, H, Ives, J, 2013, Men’s involvement in antenatal care and labour: Rethinking 
a medical model, Midwifery, 29, 7, 723–29
Frith, L, 2010. Symbiotic bioethics: a practical methodology, Bioethics, 26, 4, 198-206
Furstenberg, FF, 1988, Good dads – bad dads: two faces of fatherhood, in J. Cherlin 
(ed) The changing American family and public policy, Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 
193-218
Genesoni, L, Tallandini, M, 2009, Men’s psychological transition to fatherhood: an 
analysis of the literature, 1989–2008, Birth, 36, 4, 305-18
Ives, J, 2013, A method of reflexive balancing in a pragmatic, interdisciplinary and 
reflexive bioethics, Bioethics, 28, 6, 302-12
Ives, J, 2014, Men, maternity and moral residue: negotiating the moral demands of 
the transition to first time fatherhood, Sociology of Health and Illness, first published 
online, doi: 10.1111/1467-9566.12138.
Ives, J, Dunn, M, 2010, Who’s arguing? A call for reflexivity in bioethics, Bioethics, 
24, 5, 256-65
Racine, E, 2008, Which naturalism for bioethics: a defence of moderate (pragmatic) 
naturalism, Bioethics, 22, 2, 92-100
Ramaekers, S, Suissa, J, 2012, The claims of parenting: Reasons, responsibility and society, 
Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer
Reece H, 2013, The pitfalls of positive parenting, Ethics and Education, 8, 1, 42-54
Saldana, J, 2010, The coding manual for qualitative researchers, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications
Silverman, D, 2005, Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analysing talk, text and 
interaction, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
Stadlen, N, 2004, What mothers do: Especially when it looks like nothing, London: Judy 
Piatkus
Williams, S, 2008, What is fatherhood? Searching for the reflexive father, Sociology, 
42, 3, 487-502
Winnicott, D, 1957, What about father?, in J. Hardenberg (ed) The child and the family: 
First relationships, Tavistock Publications, 81-6 
